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The management of foreign exchange reserves has recently attracted attention from
both policy-makers and historians. Historical research has focussed on the nineteenth
century and the interwar period, with less attention to the strategies of smaller
countries in the final transition from sterling to the dollar in the post-1945 period.
This article examines the evolution of reserve currency policy from the perspective of
Australia and New Zealand in the 1960s and early 1970s. As in the 1930s, economic
uncertainty and a shift in global economic power prompted changes in reserves
strategy. Patterns of trade and debt and falling confidence in British economic policy
prompted a move away from sterling, but the timing and extent of this transition were
affected by the fragility of the sterling exchange rate, lack of alternative assets, and
continued dependence on the London capital market.The choices for Australia and
New Zealand were thus constrained, but they were able to leverage their position as
holders of sterling to engage in agreements that provided an exchange rate guarantee
for their sterling holdings and continued access to the London capital market. This
mitigated the effect of the final global transition from sterling to the dollar while
protecting their interests.
The management of foreign exchange reserves has recently attracted attentionfrom both policy-makers and historians.This interest was prompted in part by
the accumulation of large reserves by China and other surplus countries in the
2000s, and also by debates about the future of the US dollar as the balance of the
global economy appeared to shift. In investigating past episodes of changing global
reserves portfolios, Eichengreen and Flandreau found that the dollar briefly sur-
passed sterling as the main international reserve asset in the interwar period but
that sterling reasserted its dominance by the time of the Second World War.1 An
important finding from this research was that primary reserve currency status can
be lost quickly, but also reversed, which undermined other studies that had
stressed inertia in reserves portfolios. This article extends the historical literature
on shifting reserves portfolios into the postwar period.While the ascendance of the
dollar after 1945 is uncontroversial,2 the pace and pattern of the shift away from
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sterling is less well understood. Sterling was slow to disappear as a reserve asset,
and still made up over 20 per cent of global foreign exchange reserves in the
mid-1960s, despite persistent claims that it was overvalued. Moreover, the geo-
graphical distribution of sterling held in foreign exchange reserves was very
uneven, partly due to postwar exchange controls and the sterling area system.
Despite repeated devaluations and the dominance of the dollar in international
transactions, as late as 1971 sterling made up on average 62 per cent of the reserves
of 34 countries in east and south Asia, Africa, Australasia, and the Middle East.3
The reserves strategies of these countries were starkly different from Europe and
other developed nations where sterling was less than 5 per cent of reserves.Was the
relatively large share of sterling in the reserves of some countries a relic of imperial
relations or of postwar exchange controls, or the result of a deliberate strategy
reflecting patterns of trade and borrowing?The causes of the US dollar’s ascent as
a reserve currency after 1945 are uncontroversial: the dollar’s dominance as an
international commercial currency, the instability of sterling, and the dominant
economic power of the US. But several questions arise: how was this process
managed, what were the practical challenges and obstacles, and what determined
portfolio choice?
This article examines the reserves policy developed by Australia and New
Zealand to show how their portfolios were diversified during the 1960s and 1970s
and the factors that were most prominent in their portfolio management. These
cases allow us to examine countries with strong historic ties to the UK but which
were in the process of diversifying their trade and payments. Australia was the
largest official holder of sterling until the mid-1960s, and New Zealand held an
unusually large share of its reserves in sterling. They both had central banks and
were actively engaged as borrowers in the international capital market. Changing
patterns of trade and debt and falling confidence in British economic policy
prompted a movement away from sterling, but the timing and extent of this
transition were also affected by other factors. In 1968 both countries entered into
formal agreements with Britain to manage the process of diversification, and in
return were granted continued access to the London capital market and a US
dollar value guarantee of the bulk of their remaining sterling holdings. This
extended the preponderance of sterling in their reserves, but archival evidence
shows that, even before the agreements were signed, neither Australia nor New
Zealand wanted to replace all their sterling holdings with dollars; they preferred a
more balanced portfolio of dollars, sterling, Deutsche Marks, yen, and gold.They
were both reluctant to restrict their options, but they committed to levels of
sterling reserves that they were comfortable with and moved toward their ex ante
target under the agreements by 1971. They used their leverage with Britain to
ensure continued access to the London capital market while at the same time
raising capital in other countries to diversify their reserves portfolio.
In section I we discuss the literature relating to the choice of reserve currency.
Section II outlines the development of the sterling area and the place of
Australia and New Zealand within that system. In section III the economic
fundamentals and other considerations relevant to the choice of reserve currency
by Australia and New Zealand in the late 1960s and 1970s are examined. Section
3 Schenk, Decline of sterling, p. 354.
SHIFT FROM STERLING TO THE DOLLAR 1155
© 2015 The Authors. The Economic History Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Economic History Review, 68, 4 (2015)
IV traces the development of reserve currency policy, drawing upon government
and central bank archives in those countries as well as international sources.
I
There is a broad consensus on why assets denominated in particular currencies
tend to be held as foreign exchange reserves. From the supply side, Chinn and
Frankel’s review of the economic literature emphasizes characteristics of the
issuing economy as determinants of a currency’s appeal: size, share of world trade,
size and liquidity of capital markets, monetary stability, and network externalities.4
Thus the reserves role is closely identified with a currency’s international status as
a unit of account, store of value, and means of exchange. Once established,
externalities may prolong the life of a dominant reserve currency so that it outlives
its rationale based on the share of world trade or financial pre-eminence of the
issuer. Using a common international currency reduces transactions costs for
international payments and this may also influence the denomination of reserves.
In the late 1960s, Kindleberger argued that network externalities would lead to
convergence on a single or narrow range of international currencies.5 The share of
global reserves denominated in dollars peaked in the mid-1970s, when it reached
almost 80 per cent and seemed to vindicate Kindleberger’s conclusions, but it then
declined in favour of Deutsche Marks, yen, and Swiss francs, as controls on foreign
ownership of these currencies were relaxed. By 1982 the dollar share was down to
60 per cent, where it has remained more or less for most of the subsequent two
decades. In 2010 the UN noted that ‘the present system already has more than one
reserve currency, but the other currencies remain a secondary feature in a system’,
so this did not comprise a multi-currency reserve system.6 Nevertheless, there is
clearly a preference for some diversification in reserves portfolios and room for
more than one reserve asset.7
Given that a transition from one dominant currency to another is infrequent and
the relative proportions of global reserve assets are very stable, inertia or persis-
tence is a key theme in the literature. Krugman commented on the ‘surprising
persistence’ of sterling’s use as a reserve asset after the First World War.8 Explain-
ing this persistence through the post-1945 period, Eichengreen stressed that it was
‘mainly . . . a matter of loyalty by members of the Commonwealth and by colonies
with limited choice in the matter’.9 He also noted that the collective interest in
avoiding sterling’s collapse was formalized in the Sterling Agreements of 1968 that
limited diversification to protect the value of all holders’ sterling reserves. Clearly
there are costs which constrain the diversification of reserves portfolios.While the
range of supply side factors is uncontroversial, the relative importance of each is
less well understood and depends on exchange rate regimes and the purposes for
which reserves are accumulated.
4 Chinn and Frankel, ‘Euro’, pp. 56–9. See also Cohen, Geography.
5 Kindleberger, Politics.
6 United Nations, World economic situation, p. 35.
7 See Eichengreen, ‘International monetary system’, for a discussion of a future multiple reserve currency
system.
8 Krugman, ‘International role’, p. 274.
9 Eichengreen, ‘Sterling’s past,’ p. 11.
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Still on the supply side, international political economy theory stresses the role
of governments and other institutions in promoting (or discouraging) the use of
particular currencies.The use of an international currency may confer reputational
or strategic benefits on the issuer. In the 1960sValéry Giscard d’Estaing identified
the ‘exorbitant privilege’ that the US enjoyed: substantial overseas direct invest-
ment financed by central bank purchases of short-term US government debt as the
reserves of European countries increased.10 On the other hand some countries
with strong and stable currencies discouraged their use as reserve currencies, the
obvious example beingWest Germany, which feared the inflationary consequences
of permitting large foreign Deutsche Mark holdings.11 Japanese authorities also
imposed exchange controls that limited foreign holding of yen denominated assets.
Government bonds were sold directly to private financial institutions in Japan
rather than to an open market until 1978 and only a very small proportion of
government debt was available for purchase in the international market. Supplying
reserve assets brought risks as well as benefits since it increased vulnerability to
portfolio choices of other countries.
In line with what Helleiner and Kirshner termed the ‘geopolitical’ approach to
explaining why currencies win or lose reserve status, most accounts of the postwar
transition have focused on Britain’s management of sterling’s international role
rather than the strategies of sterling holders.12 The classic accounts by Shonfield
and Strange argued that successive British governments promoted sterling’s inter-
national role to enhance Britain’s global influence.13 This interpretation has been
repeated by generalist accounts, such as that of James, and to some extent by Cain
and Hopkins who stress the British elite’s promotion of sterling as a defence of the
City’s international leadership.14 While these arguments focused on the commer-
cial role of sterling, the role of sterling reserves held overseas was also an important
element of their analysis. Schenk described Britain’s management of the decline of
sterling as a more deliberate and internationally coordinated strategy to defend the
Bretton Woods system, but focused mainly on British, European, and American
perspectives rather than on the demand for sterling reserves.15
On the demand side, the literature suggests that key considerations determining
the portfolio of reserves are the share of a country’s transactions denominated in
particular currencies and the balance of risk/return on these assets. Empirical
studies of the demand for reserve currencies became more common in the 1970s,
when it seemed there might be a shift away from the dollar toward currencies like
the Deutsche Mark and Swiss franc.Thus Heller and Knight suggested that in the
mid-1970s the proportion of a nation’s reserves held in each currency was influ-
enced strongly by the exchange rate regime, so that countries pegging to the US
dollar held a relatively large proportion of US dollars as reserves.16 Research began
to focus on the optimal portfolio of reserves, bearing in mind the motives for
holding reserves, the risk and return associated with different reserve currencies,
and the authorities’ interest in promoting international financial stability. On this
10 Kirshner, Currency and coercion, pp. 194–8.
11 Holtfrerich, ‘Monetary policy’, pp. 376–90; Franke, ‘Bundesbank’.
12 Helleiner and Kirshner, ‘Future’, pp. 15–16.
13 Shonfield, British economic policy, p. 218; Strange, Sterling, p. 47.
14 James, International monetary cooperation, p. 100; Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, p. 274.
15 Schenk, Decline of sterling.
16 Heller and Knight, Reserve-currency preferences.
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basis Ben-Bassat also concluded that between 1976 and 1980 the reserves port-
folios of industrial countries were excessively dominated by US dollar assets.17 One
explanation was that the liquidity and convertibility of US dollar assets meant that
the benefits of currency diversification receded while the positive network exter-
nalities of holding dollars increased.
Bringing this literature together, Dooley, Lizondo, and Mathieson identified
trade, debt, and the anchor currency as the key determinants of reserve com-
position after 1976.18 They also found distinctive reserves portfolio strategies for
developing countries that showed greater sensitivity to the denomination of debt
service, which tied them disproportionately to the US dollar. Eichengreen and
Mathieson confirmed the stability of those three determinants during the 1980s
and 1990s.19 There remains a gap for 1965–75 that is addressed by this article;
this period saw capital account liberalization, a breakdown in a pegged exchange
rate regime, and ambitious economic development policies based on interna-
tional borrowing, all of which contributed to an uncertain environment for
policy-makers.
Research on earlier transitions confirms the importance of transactions factors
for portfolio management. Hatase and Ohnuki’s analysis of Japan’s reserves policy
between the wars shows that the anchor currency and denomination of trade and
debt were key determinants of the choice of reserve currency. The large share of
Japan’s debt service due in sterling encouraged the maintenance of substantial
sterling balances throughout the interwar period. As the value of total reserves
plummeted through the 1920s, the share of dollars increased as sterling was run
off, but this trend was reversed in 1933 when the dollar was devalued and the yen
pegged to sterling.20 Accominotti, however, found that the Banque de France’s
interwar strategy prioritized the stability of the reserve currency in order to
minimize capital losses. That strategy prompted a shift from sterling to the dollar
that was only halted in October 1930 to avoid precipitating a collapse of the
pound.21 Substantial losses were then incurred when sterling was devalued in
September 1931. These cases emphasize the constraints on the pace of diversifi-
cation and the challenges posed by exchange rate instability.
For the nineteenth century, Flandreau and Jobst emphasized persistence due to
the transactions costs of switching from one primary international currency to
another.22 They found that the costs of shifting from an incumbent increased the
share of sterling and the French franc in global transactions relative to the dollar,
although the US was a rising economic power.The apparent under-representation
of the dollar reflected the US economy’s smaller share in world trade.These cases
all suggest that trade, debt, monetary stability, and currency anchor (in a pegged
rate regime) influenced the currency distribution of reserves. A key feature of
pre-1939 studies, however, is that foreign exchange comprised a smaller propor-
tion of global reserves than in the 1960s, the balance consisting of gold. The
currency allocation of foreign exchange reserves was thus a more critical issue in
17 Ben-Bassat, Reserve-currency diversification.
18 Dooley, Lizondo, and Mathieson, ‘Currency composition’, pp. 405–9.
19 Eichengreen and Mathieson, ‘Currency composition’.
20 Hatase and Ohnuki, ‘Structure of trade’.
21 Accominotti, ‘Sterling trap’.
22 Flandreau and Jobst, ‘Empirics of international currencies’.
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the postwar period than previously, although monetary authorities faced similar
challenges from the disintegration of pegged exchange rate regimes.
The literature thus points to several determinants of the denomination of
foreign exchange reserves. The currency denomination of transactions (trade,
debt, anchor) appears to be the most important factor from the mid-1970s.
During periods of unstable exchange rates, however, calculations of risk and return
on assets came to the fore.The timing of shifts in portfolios may be affected by the
drag effects of persistence, but interwar experience suggests that transitions can be
accomplished quickly and even reversed. During the interwar period, there were
multiple reserve currencies although the predominant reserve asset was gold.The
historical cases show that the risk that sales could provoke capital losses by
prompting depreciation also affected the pace of diversification. The next section
explores how the international monetary policies of Australia and New Zealand
developed up to the 1960s.
II
The economies of Australia and New Zealand were developed by British capital
and migrants in the nineteenth century. Britain was the main trading partner of
Australia until the 1960s and New Zealand until the 1970s. Australia and New
Zealand were on a sterling exchange standard by the late nineteenth century,
which meant that the bulk of their external reserves consisted not of gold but of
sterling assets held in London.23 This arrangement was convenient for the British
authorities because the Bank of England did not maintain large gold stocks, and
did not want to share gold with colonial banks. In 1902 the British even forced
India to exchange its gold reserves for sterling balances.24 Although the sterling
area was not created until 1940, a distinctive sterling group of countries already
existed before 1914.
Australia and New Zealand lacked central banks until well into the interwar
period.The Commonwealth Bank of Australia, set up as a state-owned commercial
bank in 1911, developed gradually into a central bank with responsibility for
managing the sterling reserves and the exchange rate during the 1920s and 1930s.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) was created in 1934, principally to
effect monetary separation from Australia. Both Australia and New Zealand
pegged to sterling after Britain’s departure from gold in 1931 and thus became
members of the sterling ‘bloc’. As Cain and Hopkins show, although Australia and
New Zealand continued to be part of the gentlemanly capitalist nexus and
depended on London financially and commercially, they were also becoming
increasingly assertive.25 Economic and financial relationships with Britain were
now matters for negotiation. Rather than outposts of the Bank of England, the
Commonwealth Bank and RBNZ were set to become partners and agents of the
governments in Canberra and Wellington.26 The economic alliance with Britain
strengthened in the 1940s, but the relationship was increasingly grounded in
intergovernmental cooperation. Governments now mediated between the domin-
ions and the City of London.
23 Tocker, ‘Monetary standards’.
24 de Cecco, Money and empire, pp. 68–73.
25 Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, pp. 112–16, 134–7.
26 Singleton, ‘Central bank and government’, pp. 105–12.
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Australia and New Zealand (alongside other sterling area countries) accumu-
lated vast sterling balances between 1939 and 1945. Partly as a result of US
agricultural protectionism, they struggled to earn US dollars directly, and found it
convenient to remain in the sterling area, exporting produce to Britain and
exchanging sterling receipts for US dollars from the ‘pool’ in London in order to
buy goods from America. Although some colonies were compelled to hold sterling
up to the late 1950s, other major sterling holders faced fewer external controls, and
Australia and New Zealand faced none.27 Perceived national self-interest rather
than loyalty explains these arrangements.
During the 1950s, however, the financial and commercial links between Aus-
tralasia and Britain began to decay. The British started to think that western
Europe might offer a more dynamic market than the Commonwealth, while
sterling area countries grew unsettled by the limited capacity of UK capital and
commodity markets and by the subsidization of British farmers. Australia and New
Zealand started to borrow in New York as well as in London. They embarked on
a search for new trading partners in the Asia-Pacific. Australia’s trade with Japan,
which was normalized in the 1950s, boomed in the 1960s. The Japanese had a
seemingly limitless appetite for Australian natural resources. Trade between New
Zealand and Japan also grew, but less explosively.28 In the 1960s Australia and
New Zealand tapped into the Euromarkets by making official bond issues.
As their trading and financial networks expanded, the Australian and New
Zealand authorities reassessed the wisdom of maintaining the bulk of their reserves
in sterling. Wider trends had a bearing on their choice. By 1960 many colonies
were either independent or on the verge of independence, and Britain could no
longer curb their spending. Although sterling became convertible on current
account for non-residents in December 1958, the pound remained weak relative to
the Deutsche Mark and the US dollar because of Britain’s lacklustre competitive-
ness, heavy military commitments, and the overhang of sterling balances.The US
and other financial powers were persuaded that sterling must be propped up
because, in the event of its sudden collapse as a reserve currency, sellers would
turn their attention to the dollar, which in the Vietnam era was beginning to
experience financial problems of a similar nature to those afflicting Britain. Even
in the 1960s, however, sterling was not entirely lacking in appeal as a reserve
currency. Interest rates were higher in London than in NewYork orWest Germany,
compensating sterling holders for increased risk. In addition there was unease
about the stability of the US dollar, while the Deutsche Mark, though attractive,
was scarce.
The British objective in the 1960s was to secure a gradual and smooth exit
from the burdensome role of supplying and managing a reserve currency, pref-
erably without harming their sterling area partners.29 Once sterling holders had
suffered capital losses from Britain’s 14.3 per cent devaluation in November
1967, the threat of further exchange risk made holding sterling less tenable. As
part of a deal to obtain further backing for sterling from leading central banks,
Britain negotiated Sterling Agreements with official sterling holders in 1968.
These agreements limited the pace of diversification in return for a US dollar
27 Capie, Bank of England, p. 155.
28 Singleton and Robertson, Economic relations, pp. 129–35, 204–8.
29 Schenk, Decline of sterling, pp. 244–5.
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exchange rate guarantee. Countries that retained significant trade links with
Britain and debts in London found it convenient to sign up to Sterling Agree-
ments and continue to hold some sterling until the mid-1970s. Figure 1 con-
firms that, for most of the 1950s and 1960s, the retreat from sterling as a global
reserve currency was gradual rather than abrupt; indeed sterling’s share was
stable during the second half of the 1960s despite the 1967 devaluation.
III
We now examine in more detail the economic fundamentals and other factors
underpinning the persistence of sterling as the reserve currency of Australia and
New Zealand into the 1960s and early 1970s. Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate that the
commitment of Australia and New Zealand to sterling (as measured by the
proportions of reserves, the stock of official overseas debt, and trade denominated
in sterling) eroded in the 1960s and 1970s. In the early 1960s both countries held
more than 90 per cent of their reserves in sterling. In Australia’s case this was
greatly in excess of the sterling share of official overseas debt and trade. New
Zealand’s trade and official external debt remained heavily skewed towards
Britain, and the reliance on sterling reserves at that stage is perhaps less worthy of
comment.
Both countries explicitly recognized the likelihood that reserves would eventu-
ally be diversified along with the direction of international economic relations.
From 1951 Australia began to invest the proceeds of premium gold sales in the US
and from 1965 the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), which had demerged from
the Commonwealth Bank in 1960, retained the dollar earnings of US investments
in US dollar assets.30 This led to a modest accumulation of dollars, and sterling’s
share of reserves fell to about 64 per cent by June 1967. At this point the Australian
Treasurer reassured the Chancellor of the Exchequer that the decline in sterling
30 Reserve Bank of Australia Archives, Sydney (hereafter RBAA), BM-Pe-87, memorandum for RBA board,
meeting 8 Nov. 1967. European central banks informed the RBA that holding of substantial reserves in European
centres would not be welcomed.
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was mainly due to balance of payments deficits and ‘our policy has been and still
is to hold our main overseas reserves in sterling’.31 The pace of change accelerated
sharply after the 1967 sterling devaluation, which reduced the value of official
reserves by A$98 million.32 While the RBA considered that sterling was ‘not very
attractive as a reserve asset’ by 1968, alternatives were not unproblematic since
‘there is a good chance that the [US] dollar will continue to experience troubles’
and ‘other countries are not keen to have their moneys become reserve curren-
cies’.33 Most countries were reluctant to have their currencies develop as major
global reserve assets because of the danger that this would make their monetary
systems vulnerable to changes in external sentiment, so the RBA had to enter into
bilateral consultations with the West German and Japanese central banks to
acquire Deutsche Marks and yen. The RBA reassured the Bundesbank and the
Bank of Japan ‘that unless there were quite abnormal circumstances we would not
be a volatile mover of funds’.34 This limited the liquidity of such assets.
Britain remained a more important trading partner of New Zealand for longer
and the diversification of reserves occurred later. Even so, in April 1968 the deputy
secretary to the New Zealand Treasury advised the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS) that ‘as a result of the possible future pattern of trade of NZ, his
country’s reserves would naturally become diversified without the need to convert
31 RBAA, GDB-70-3, letter from W. McMahon to James Callaghan, 17 July 1967.
32 There were further losses of A$34 million on forward banks’ exchange commitments and A$26 million in
other foreign exchange obligations, bringing the total to A$158 million. RBAA, BM-Pe-89, aide memoire for
governor, 30 Jan. 1968.
33 RBAA, BM-I-24, paper for RBA board, 23 July 1968.
34 RBAA, BM-80–245, governor’s note for Treasurer, 7 March 1977.
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sterling balances’.35 Reserves policy was expected passively to reflect the changes
in New Zealand’s international economic relations.
Figure 4 shows the declining share of Australian official obligations repayable in
sterling, mainly due to increased US dollar borrowing in the 1950s and 1960s, and
Deutsche Mark and Swiss franc borrowing in the 1970s. Data are valued in
Australian dollars at current exchange rates, but valuation effects are not signifi-
cant until the 14.3 per cent sterling devaluation of 1967. In that year, the sterling
value of obligations from London fell by 8 per cent in addition to the valuation
effects. There was a direct relationship between foreign currency borrowing and
the denomination of reserves when the proceeds of foreign loans were converted to
domestic currency for local government spending. The tightness of the US and
British markets for lending to New Zealand and Australia in the mid-1960s
encouraged their central banks to borrow in other currencies such as Deutsche
35 Bank for International Settlements Archives, Basel (hereafter BISA), 2/319, Reserve Bank of New Zealand
Wellington 1954–91, note by R. G. Stevenson (BIS) of visit from H. G. Lang, deputy secretary to New Zealand
Treasury, 17 April 1968.
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Marks and Swiss francs, which increased foreign exchange reserves.36 During this
period, Treasury and central bank officials from both countries toured European
financial centres to meet bankers and negotiate loans. Australia also began to
accumulate yen reserves from August 1972 from the proceeds of loans raised from
Japanese banks.37 Rather than the historic ties of empire or Commonwealth, the
driving factors in the distribution of Australia’s reserves were increasingly the
tightening of the London capital market and the opening of international capital
markets in the US, Europe, and Japan, tempered by the desire to forestall a costly
run on sterling.
Data on currency of repayment are not available for New Zealand, but the
currency composition of the stock of New Zealand’s official overseas debt, as
shown in figure 5, followed a similar path to Australia’s, although at a different
pace. In New Zealand the proportion of official debt denominated in sterling did
not fall below 40 per cent until the mid-1970s. As sterling debt matured, however,
New Zealand (like Australia) was inclined to replace it with debt denominated in
Deutsche Marks, Swiss francs, or guilders because interest rates were lower on the
36 BISA, 2/324, Reserve Bank of Australia Policy 1960–88, memo of visit from H. M. Knight, manager of the
investment department of the RBA, 22 May 1967; BISA, 2/319, Reserve Bank of New Zealand Wellington
1954–91, letter from Wilson, governor of RBNZ, to D. H. McDonald (BIS), 28 June 1966.
37 RBAA, BM-75-234, RBA board minute, 1 Sept. 1972. $A26.7 million worth of yen were raised at the end
of July 1972; 70% was invested in Japanese government T-bills and bonds and 30% deposited with the BIS.
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Continent than in London or New York.38 The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
borrowings are shown separately in figure 5 and were split among several
currencies.39
By the mid-1960s, the gradual erosion of trade and financial relations with the
UK was diminishing the motives to use sterling as the sole reserve asset for
Australia and New Zealand. Reserves were diversified through foreign borrowing
as access to the London capital market became more difficult. This was also part
of a deliberate longer-term strategy to reduce the sterling share of reserves in
response to the changing geography of international economic relations.
However, both countries continued to peg their exchange rate to the pound until
1972 so sterling was needed for intervention and precautionary purposes. The
pace of diversification was affected by the need to avert capital losses that might
arise from rapid sales of sterling assets that could precipitate further devaluation.
The archive evidence also shows doubts about the attractions of the US dollar
as an alternative and difficulties in accumulating the more attractive currencies
such as the Deutsche Mark and yen. The next section discusses how, from 1968,
the diversification process was transferred from voluntary action to contractual
agreement.
38 Singleton, ‘Euromarkets’, pp. 256–60.
39 In 1971, 53% of New Zealand’s borrowing from the IBRD was repayable in US dollars, 15.7% in sterling,
12.1% in DM, and the balance in other currencies. RBNZA, box A0369, brief for Commonwealth finance
ministers and IMF annual meetings 1971, p. 182.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
%
 o
f 
to
ta
l
Other
Yen
Other Europe
Deutsche Mark
IBRD
IMF
Australian $
US $
Sterling
Figure 5. New Zealand: composition of official overseas debt, 1954–80
Sources: RBNZA, boxes A0040, A0060, A0068, A0075, A0134, A0192; New Zealand, Appendices.
SHIFT FROM STERLING TO THE DOLLAR 1165
© 2015 The Authors. The Economic History Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Economic History Review, 68, 4 (2015)
We contend that Australia and New Zealand held sterling reserves during the
1960s for economically rational reasons. Britain was the main trading partner of
Australia until the 1960s and of New Zealand until the 1970s. Sterling area
countries enjoyed preferential access to the London capital market, and both
Australia and New Zealand were significant international borrowers. The risk of
holding sterling was mitigated by the relatively high interest rates earned in
London and the declining resilience of the gold value of the US dollar. Archival
evidence shows that decisions on the composition of reserves were frequently
debated and the strategies deployed were based on calculation rather than senti-
ment or coercion. Negative network effects also mattered since news that either
country planned to diversify risked a stampede that would devalue remaining
reserves. From the outside, holding sterling when it was apparent it would soon
lose value might be seen as loyalty, but there was also self-interest and a careful
evaluation of risk. For example, in July 1967 the governor of the RBA reassured his
counterpart at the Bank of England that ‘we are very conscious of the possible
effect which a rapid change in our figures or our practices could have and we have
been . . . very careful to avoid going so fast or so far in currency re-arrangement
as to attract undue attention to the moment’.40 Two weeks before the November
1967 sterling devaluation, the International Department of the RBA noted that ‘on
pragmatic grounds an attempt by Australia to make a very large switch [out of
sterling] quickly would at once become common knowledge, and would be likely
to start a flood of speculation against sterling’ so ‘we see no alternative to the
present policy of changing the balance of the holdings rather more slowly than, on
investment grounds, we might wish’.41 To some extent, therefore, sterling holders
had a common interest that justified cooperation. While Australia and New
Zealand left themselves vulnerable to capital losses from devaluation, they also had
too much to lose to take the risk of themselves prompting a collapse of the sterling
exchange rate or a suspension of convertibility. We shall see below that they were
eventually rewarded with a dollar value guarantee for their official sterling reserves.
IV
Relying on common interest and fear to prop up sterling was a fragile proposition
once global confidence in the pound was battered by the devaluation in 1967.
Given the unstable international financial climate, in 1968 the Bank of England
approached other leading central banks through the BIS, to secure further support
for sterling. Under the Basel Agreement the G10 central banks (plus Switzerland)
extended a US$2 billion credit to the Bank of England as a safety net during the
diversification of overseas-held sterling reserves, thereby hoping to forestall a run
on the pound that would extend to the US dollar.To minimize the likelihood that
the credit would be drawn, the BIS insisted that Britain negotiate bilateral Sterling
Agreements with 34 members of the sterling area to keep a minimum proportion
of their reserves in sterling. In return, Britain had to guarantee the US dollar value
of 90 per cent of the official sterling reserves of these countries so long as the
minimum sterling proportion (MSP) was met. According to one contemporary
40 RBAA, letter from H. C. Coombs to L. O’Brien (Bank of England), 18 July 1967.
41 RBAA, BM-Pe-87, memo for governor by International Department, 6 Nov. 1967.
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economist, sterling suddenly became ‘the “safest” international asset available to
central monetary authorities’.42 The Bank of England guarantee subsidized the use
of sterling as a reserve asset since central banks earned high London interest rates
on assets that, under the dollar value guarantee, were equivalent in many ways to
US dollar assets. After surviving the collapse of Bretton Woods, the floating of the
pound, and the formal end of the sterling area in 1972, the Sterling Agreements
were discontinued in December 1974, by which time the burden on Britain from
outstanding sterling liabilities had been eroded by inflation.These Sterling Agree-
ments underpinned the diversification strategies of Australia, New Zealand, and
the other signatories through the early 1970s. The regime was an exercise in
managing risks for Britain, overseas sterling holders, and Britain’s other creditors.
Just before the MSP negotiations began, on 3 July 1968 the RBA board ‘noted
the longer-term trends in the directions of Australian trade and in the location of
public indebtedness, and felt that on these grounds the disposition of our reserve
remained too heavily weighted towards sterling’.43 The target was to achieve equal
proportions of gold, sterling, and other foreign exchange, thus bringing the sterling
share down to one-third from about one-half of total reserves.The RBA governor
H. C. Coombs explained to theTreasurerWilliam McMahon that ‘we feel that this
distribution recognises our interests in having access to capital markets, and
improves our defence against international monetary disturbances.We also believe
that the proposal is consistent with our international responsibilities including a
willingness to share in international support for sterling’.44 To sustain confidence
in sterling despite diversification, the RBA was willing to lend gold and currencies
to the UK, directly or through the BIS, to give the appearance of bolstering the UK
reserves. The key priority for the Australian Treasury was continued access to the
London capital market for government borrowing. This provoked some tension
between the RBA board in Sydney and the Treasury in Canberra, with the former
adopting the more aggressive stance on the issue of diversification away from
sterling.
The RBA board discussed diversification again at the end of July 1968.The new
governor Jock Phillips noted that ‘one’s currency only stays in demand as a reserve
currency when one is a dominant trader’ but Britain’s position was eroding. On the
other hand, he observed that ‘one can earn over 8 per cent on local governments
in the UK and that this is a handsome return’. He acknowledged that ‘no one can
pick the uniquely right time to leave sterling (perhaps it was last October) and
certainly a total change over-night is impossible. But in the long-run sterling seems
pointed towards the abandonment of its role as a reserve currency. Hence our need
to move towards other assets’. He noted that ‘The prospects for the US economy
(and therefore the US dollar), whilst not overly rosy, were better than for Britain’.
He suggested four reasons to accumulate dollars:
‘1. large and unfavourable trade
2. prospects for borrowing
3. security yields are fairly attractive
4. large market—i.e. securities marketable’.45
42 Zis, ‘Sterling problem’, p. 348.
43 RBAA, BM-Pe-95, board meeting minute, 3 July 1968.
44 RBAA, GDB-70-3, telegram from Coombs in Sydney to Treasurer in Canberra, 21 June 1968.
45 RBAA, BM-Pe-95, board meeting minutes, 31 July 1968. Phillips became chairman on 22 July 1968.
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Just as Britain was about to ask Australia to restrict diversification, therefore, the
RBA favoured continuing the process begun in the mid-1960s.
New Zealand was still overwhelmingly dependent on sterling reserves. Alan
Low, governor of the RBNZ, treated the British proposals as an opportunity to
accelerate New Zealand’s reserves diversification. Low had already informed the
Bank of England that New Zealand wanted to diversify its holdings to some extent,
not least because the amount of non-sterling debt coming due for repayment was
anticipated to rise.46 Low noted that each reserve currency had pros and cons.The
US dollar, while far from strong, was unlikely to depreciate relative to sterling
(three years later, it did). Like Australia, New Zealand had already started to retain
dollar earnings rather than selling them to the Bank of England and Low wanted
to continue this practice. Furthermore, Low felt that when New Zealand borrowed
currencies that might appreciate, such as the Deutsche Mark, it should cover the
risk by leaving borrowed funds in the same currency.The government already had
a NZ£13 million Deutsche Mark liability, and a further loan in Deutsche Marks
was being negotiated.The return on reserves also mattered. US interest rates were
attractive, but lower than nominal rates on British assets, reflecting differences in
risk. Overall, Low did not favour a decisive switch out of sterling: ‘While . . .
alternative forms of reserve holdings are available to us there continue to be
significant advantages in holding sterling, notwithstanding the risk that sterling
might be devalued’. Sterling was still a ‘usable’ currency and ‘London continues to
offer the best interest rates and the best facilities for the investment of funds, and
most of our trade will continue to be denominated in sterling.We should continue
to regard sterling as the basic component of our reserves’.47 The RBNZ contem-
plated moving towards the following composition: sterling (50–60 per cent), US
dollars (20–5 per cent), European currencies (10 per cent), and gold (10–15 per
cent).48 New Zealand clearly regarded the holding of multiple reserve currencies
rather than a simple move to the US dollar as the best way forward, if practicable.
At the New Zealand Treasury, Cop Davis signified general acceptance of the
British proposals: ‘Basically this appears to be a reasonable approach to strengthen
sterling and to provide some protection against a further sterling devaluation’.49
However, the initial British offer, which included an MSP of 80 per cent, was
unacceptable, for it ‘would penalise New Zealand “for having played the game”
while other sterling area countries have been diversifying their reserves as rapidly
as practicable’.50 New Zealand negotiators also sought assurances about borrow-
ing rights in London.51
In the end, the outcome was to sustain the status quo of reserves denomination
through mutual agreement for three years, with provision for extension. Both
Australia and New Zealand made concessions over the MSP. While the record
shows that the internal targets on the eve of the negotiations were 33 per cent for
46 RBNZA, Box A0088, memo for minister of finance: ‘The sterling balances—a proposed scheme’, 20 June
1968, pp. 3–4.
47 Ibid., p. 6.
48 Ibid., p. 7.
49 Archives New Zealand,Wellington (hereafter ANZ), AALR 873, Acc.W3158/84, 61/4/2/1, pt. 1, memo from
N. R. Davis to minister of finance, 19 July 1968, p. 1.
50 Ibid., p. 3.
51 ANZ, AALR 873, Acc.W3158/84, 61/4/2/1, pt. 1, briefing for sterling area negotiations July 1968, undated,
p. 5.
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Australia and 50–60 per cent for New Zealand, the minimum sterling proportions
under the Sterling Agreements concluded in September 1968 were 40 per cent for
Australia and 70 per cent for New Zealand. Both countries also agreed to informal
targets of 45 per cent and 80 per cent respectively.52 In return for the loss of
autonomy over reserves management, both countries sought continued access to
the London capital market.
The link between the denomination of reserves and access to the London capital
market was formalized at Australia’s insistence. In March 1966, as part of an effort
to restrict drains on the balance of payments, the UK Treasury had introduced
controls on the reinvested profits of British companies in Australia, New Zealand,
and South Africa. The Australian Treasury insisted that their Sterling Agreement
include a proviso to reconsider the MSP commitments were the UK to introduce
any further capital controls. Additionally, Australia was able to negotiate a special
provision whereby maturing sterling loans that could not be refinanced in London
could be added to the calculation of the MSP, thus linking the continued holding
of sterling reserves to access to the London capital market. In effect, if the
Australian government could not borrow in the London market, they could
diversify their reserves to the extent of debts repaid in London. New Zealand was
given an informal undertaking along the same lines,53 but the Australians insisted
on formal recognition of the principle, and a side letter to this effect was forth-
coming in November, and then extended to New Zealand. Thus when New
Zealand did not renew a £15 million loan in September 1968, because the London
interest rate was too high, £15 million was added to the calculation of New
Zealand’s sterling reserves.54 This kept reported sterling reserves above the statu-
tory minimum 70 per cent at the end of 1969 and 1970. Additionally, the foreign
exchange proceeds of government overseas borrowing in Deutsche Marks or US
dollars were not included in the calculation of the MSP until three months after
funds were received to allow for short-term effects on reserves composition.
The first renewal of the Sterling Agreements came just after President Nixon
suspended gold convertibility and allowed the US dollar to depreciate in August
1971. The new terms included a 10 per cent across-the-board reduction in the
MSP (the new MSPs were 36 per cent for Australia and 63 per cent for New
Zealand), thus allowing for controlled diversification towards the target levels
identified in each country in 1968. But the Bank of England and the UK Treasury
insisted that the threshold of the guarantee would not be changed despite the
devaluation of the US dollar against the pound in August 1971. Once the exchange
rate was stabilized at £1 = $US2.60 in December 1971, an 8.5 per cent deprecia-
tion of sterling was required to trigger compensation under the guarantee. Never-
theless, Australia and New Zealand accepted renewal because the MSP did not
seriously constrain them, while the guarantee offered some degree of protection for
the real returns on sterling assets arising from high nominal interest rates.
52 In practice during the first agreement, the RBA kept a margin of about 2% above the desired level to cover
unexpected fluctuations. RBAA, BM-I-60, memorandum for International Committee, 30 July 1970.
53 ANZ, AALR 873, Acc.W3158/84, 61/4/2/1, pt. 2, B. Tallboys to R. Jenkins, 24 Sept. 1968; R. Jenkins to R.
Muldoon, 1 Oct. 1968; National Archives of Australia, Canberra (hereafter NAA), A432/31, 1968/487, letter
from M. W. O’Donnell, acting secretary to the Treasury, Australia, to C. L. Hewitt, secretary, Prime Minister’s
Department, Canberra, 19 Sept. 1968.
54 TNA, T312/2811, minute for Mr Hay by A. F. Case, 2 March 1970.
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Three months after renewal, both Australia and New Zealand shifted their
formal exchange rate peg in the IMF from sterling to the US dollar under the
Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971.This marked an important dislocation
from sterling, but did not immediately affect reserves policy because of the Sterling
Agreements.55 Six months later in June 1972, sterling was floated against the US
dollar, and the sterling area was formally wound up with the removal of the
‘scheduled territory’ designation under the Exchange Control Act. Nevertheless,
the British almost immediately signalled interest in a further three-year extension
of the Sterling Agreements, with a smaller amount of sterling guaranteed and a
further reduction in MSPs. This time, the renewal negotiations prompted collec-
tive action. Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore held a joint meeting
in Canberra in July 1972, a week before a British delegation arrived. Australia and
New Zealand were in favour of renewing in order to protect the value of their
remaining sterling balances, but they wanted a new trigger rate for compensation
and lower MSPs.The RBA noted that Australia was likely to remain a substantial
sterling holder since the range of alternative investments was limited by restrictions
on the use of European currencies as reserve assets, and because ‘the US dollar is
an uncertain asset’.56 Bernard Galvin of New Zealand noted that his country’s
trade and debt remained heavily oriented to sterling so ‘New Zealand was likely to
hold sterling anyway and therefore it would be helpful to have a guarantee’.57
Considerable support emerged at this meeting for linking the guarantee to the
sterling/special drawing rights (SDR) exchange rate (to reduce exposure to the
dollar) and for an option of compensation payable in US dollars, gold, or SDRs.
Overall, ‘The basic line of thought [at Canberra] . . . was to seek to obtain the
highest possible amount to be covered by the guarantee with the lowest MSP’.58
The British were in a hurry to settle, fearing that continued uncertainty about the
international monetary system and the effects of Britain’s membership of the
European Economic Community could unsettle confidence in sterling. They
assured former members that abolition of the sterling area would not constrain
their access to the London capital market. But their insistence on reducing the
proportion of reserves covered by the guarantee in any extension encouraged
Australia and New Zealand to reject the offer. British officials perceived ‘a marked
apathy’ toward renewing the agreements among former sterling area countries and
the search for a quick commitment was abandoned.59
Instead, when the 1971 agreements expired in September 1973, the British
offered to extend them for six months on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis. Most countries,
including Australia and New Zealand, accepted. The level of sterling balances
covered by the US dollar guarantee was now the lower of the amounts held on 24
September 1973 or on 29 March 1974, with compensation due if the average
55 Schenk and Singleton, ‘Basket pegs’.
56 RBAA, IT-h-327, briefing paper for governor, 28 June 1972.
57 RBAA, IT-h-327, note of meeting in Australian Treasury with representatives from Singapore, Malaysia, and
New Zealand, 14 July 1972.
58 ANZ, AALR 873, Acc.W3158/84, 61/4/2/1, pt. 3, memo from secretary of Treasury for minister of finance:
Canberra meeting of officials from Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, and New Zealand on 14 July 1972, dated 21
July 1972; RBAA, IT-h-327, B. Galvin (NZ Treasury) to R. B. Whitelaw, Australian Treasury, 4 Aug. 1972.
59 ANZ, AALR 873, Acc.W3158/84, 61/4/2/1, pt. 4, notes on meeting on sterling area held in Mr H. G. Lang’s
office, 19 Feb. 1972.
1170 JOHN SINGLETON AND CATHERINE R. SCHENK
© 2015 The Authors. The Economic History Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Economic History Review, 68, 4 (2015)
sterling/US dollar exchange rate fell below US$2.4213.60 Rejecting the British
offer would have threatened a fire sale of sterling securities so a modicum of
solidarity was preserved by the agreements.61 Unlike previous agreements, the
MSP required the RBA to buy sterling regularly, up to a total of £115 million by
March 1974.62 By this time the shift to the dollar anchor had proved to be a
short-lived answer to economies seeking exchange rate stability. In July 1973 New
Zealand adopted a basket peg.
When the second agreement was due to expire, British officials tried to interest
key sterling holders, including Australia, in a less formal gentlemen’s agreement,
but met with no enthusiasm. Instead, in March 1974 the British offered a final
extension until December to mitigate pressure on sterling during the general
election campaign.The MSP was reduced to 32 per cent for Australia and 56 per
cent for New Zealand, and the trigger for implementing the guarantee was now
expressed in terms of the effective exchange rate for sterling against a currency
basket.63 Compensation would be paid if the average effective depreciation of
sterling over the period of the agreement exceeded the average effective deprecia-
tion of sterling from 23 September 1973 to 31 April 1974. The three sets of
agreements brought modest compensation to sterling holders when the pound
depreciated—£58 million in total after the float in 1972 and £100 million in total
in 1973–4. Compensation amounting to £12.9 million was paid to Australia in
January 1973, while New Zealand eventually received £3.7 million.64 In May
1974, Britain paid Australia £15.763 million in compensation, and New Zealand
a further £6.937 million.65 However, the success of the Sterling Agreements
should be measured not by the amount of compensation paid but by the avoidance
over the previous five years of a precipitate flight from sterling which would have
harmed all parties.
Although the commodity boom of the early 1970s brought Australia and New
Zealand a large influx of sterling reserves, the underlying rationale for diversifica-
tion remained. Timing was a key consideration, as was the need to avoid a
stampede. As explained in an internal RBNZ paper in January 1974, the goal of
reserves policy was ‘to preserve liquidity in important currencies, spread exchange
risk, and earn a reasonable income’. One option, albeit not pursued, was to shadow
the evolving pattern of trade.66 The policy in early 1974 was to hold 65 per cent of
reserves in sterling, 20 per cent in US dollars, and 15 per cent in other currencies.
The New Zealand Treasury argued that the ‘objectives should be to lower the
proportion of our reserves held in sterling and to acquire greater freedom of choice
in their management’.67 Less tangible factors were not ignored, and in January
1974 the deputy governor of the RBNZ felt that ‘a total shift [out of sterling]
60 RBNZA, box A0068, file 57, memo for directors: sterling reserves agreement, 10 Oct. 1973.
61 ANZ, AALR 873, Acc.W3158/84, 61/4/2/1 pt. 4, notes for brief: sterling reserves agreement, undated [Sept.
1973].
62 RBAA, BM-75-256, note for the governor by International Department, 5 March 1974.
63 RBNZA, annual report 1973/4, p. 23.
64 TNA, T358/19, Chancellor’s brief for meeting with Bill Rowling, New Zealand minister of overseas trade,
28 Sept. 1973.
65 TNA,T258/19, brief for meeting of Henry Lang, secretary of New Zealand Treasury, with MrWass, 11 Oct.
1974.
66 RBNZA, box A0075, file policy papers, 4 Dec. 1973–2 April 1974, memo for chief cashier: sterling reserves
agreement, 10 Jan. 1974.
67 ANZ, AALR 873, Acc. W3158/84, 61/4/2/1, pt. 4, note on sterling reserves agreement, undated 1974.
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would not be practicable on political grounds’.68 As late as October 1974, New
Zealand officials expressed anxiety about being ‘locked into sterling’ because at
current interest rates any sale of British securities would result in a loss.69 A further
extension of the agreement might have been viewed favourably in Wellington, but
it was not to be.
In June 1974 Frank Crean, the Australian Treasurer, notified the British that
Australia intended to withdraw from its Sterling Agreement.The British Treasury
remarked sanguinely that ‘this is not unexpected—we have known for some time
that the Australians have found strict observance of the complicated guarantee
conditions to be irksome’. The timing was influenced by the expectation of
substantial balance of payments deficits over the following year that would halve
Australia’s overall reserves and make it more difficult to retain the sterling share.70
Crean explained that he was seeking ‘greater freedom of action in respect to the
disposition of our reserves . . . moreover we do not think it appropriate that we
should be seeking compensation from you in respect of further changes in the value
of sterling’.71 By August the sterling share had fallen to 18 per cent. At the request
of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, no publicity was given to the
abrogation of the Sterling Agreement, since ‘the market could in present circum-
stances easily misinterpret or over-react’. After the publication of Australia’s
reserves in August 1974, however, a low key announcement was made.72
When New Zealand’s Sterling Agreement expired in December 1974, the
RBNZ began to sell sterling, and the retreat gathered pace in the latter half of
1975.73 Relieved officials in Wellington remarked, in December 1975, that ‘the
recent improvement in the United Kingdom gilt market has given us the oppor-
tunity to move out of long term sterling investments’.74 Admittedly, finessing the
exit from sterling was not the primary focus of policy when New Zealand was
struggling with an acute balance of payments crisis in the wake of oil price
increases and the collapse of export prices. By March 1976, sterling, the US dollar,
and the Deutsche Mark had almost equal shares of New Zealand’s official
reserves, though the dominance of the US dollar was cemented thereafter.75
Figure 6 shows the adherence of Australia and New Zealand to the MSP levels
in the Sterling Agreements based solely on their actual sterling reserves, and with
the un-refinanced London loans added to the notional sterling reserves to calcu-
late the MSP. At times the inclusion of un-refinanced loans kept New Zealand
above the MSP, but, for Australia, that was true only in the last months of
adherence to their Sterling Agreement. At the time of the renewal in September
1971 the MSP was not binding on Australia since sterling reserves were well in
excess of the MSP. There was stronger seasonality to New Zealand’s reserve
68 RBNZA, box A0075, file policy papers, 4 Dec. 1973–2 April 1974, minutes of meeting of Policy Committee,
22 Jan. 1974.
69 ANZ, AALR873, Acc. 3158, item 84,T61/4/2, pt. 7, sterling area gold and dollar reserves 1971–5, cable for
Lang from Treasury, 14 Oct. 1974.
70 TNA, FCO59/1124, D. A. Walker, confidential note for Hedley-Miller, 28 June 1974.
71 TNA, FCO59/1124, telegram relaying message from Crean to Healey, 26 June 1974.
72 TNA, FCO59/1124, telegram from Healey to Crean, 2 July 1974.
73 In mid-December RBNZ ordered US$60 million for delivery in the first quarter of 1975. The Bank of
England assumed this was to adjust to the end of the MSP; BEA, OV44/235.
74 ANZ, AALR 873, Acc. W5427, item 1740, 70/5/76, pt. 1, IMF Article 14 consultations 1976, replies to
questionnaire, undated, p. 85.
75 Deane et al., eds., External economic structure, p. 337.
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distribution, with the sterling share falling in the last quarter of each calendar year.
In both cases the commodity boom of 1971 led to increased holdings of sterling
but Australia quickly diversified these assets and had approached its MSP by
November 1972.
The value of the guarantee to participants can be measured by the nominal
spread between returns on US and British reserve assets, assuming that most of
the gap reflected the risk premium on the exchange rate of sterling.The continuous
threat of sterling depreciation increased the nominal cost of borrowing in sterling
for the British government and the returns on British government securities.
Table 1 summarizes the average monthly spread between US and UK Treasury
Bills during the four phases of the agreements.
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Figure 6. Adherence to Sterling Agreement (% sterling reserves), Sept. 1968–May
1974
Sources: New Zealand: 1968–Sept. 1971 and Oct. 1972–May 1974, BEA, EID15/5 and EID15/7; Oct. 1971–Sept. 1972, TNA,
FCO59/877. Australia: BEA, EID15/5, EID15/6, EID15/7.
Table 1. Spread between UK and US Treasury Bills
during sterling agreements
Agreements
Average spread
(percentage points)
I: 1968–71 1.242292
II 1971–3 1.406667
III: 1973–4 4.105
IV: 1974 3.251
Sources: UK: Office for National Statistics; USA: Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System Historical Data, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/
data.htm.
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Once sterling had floated in June 1972, the greater exchange rate depreciation
required before compensation was triggered undermined the benefits of the guar-
antee. In August 1972 the RBA board noted that:
on income grounds there would be a strong preference for sterling assets over US dollar
assets at present—the margin on 3-month Treasury bills is about 1.7 per cent p.a. in
favour of the UK. However, future movements in US interest rates may whittle this
margin away. Moreover, with sterling floating, only a small exchange rate variation
would be necessary to offset substantial rate differentials.
They concluded that:
on balance, we are inclined to think that we should not hold unnecessary amounts of
sterling. Thus we would favour keeping the MSP ratio not too far above the minimum
requirement of 36 per cent. As has always been the case, we need a margin over the MSP
minimum to protect against any unexpected fall in our sterling funds and other
contingencies. An actual minimum ratio of 41/42 per cent is a safe but not
excessive minimum working level for the ratio, consistent with the formal minimum of
36 per cent.
At the time the sterling proportion was about 44 per cent and it was agreed to keep
it at about that level and ‘in any case not below 42 per cent’.76
The Sterling Agreements of 1968–74 are an important, but sometimes
neglected, aspect of the management of the diversification of reserves during the
end of the Bretton Woods era. They allowed official reserves to be held in sterling
with little risk to their dollar value during a period of volatile dollar–sterling
exchange rates.The value of the guarantee eroded after 1971 when both currencies
became more unstable and both Australia and New Zealand preferred to accu-
mulate Deutsche Marks, yen, or Swiss francs, but there were restrictions from the
issuing countries on accumulating these currencies as reserves. Both countries
pegged their currencies to the dollar from the end of 1971 and received compen-
sation for the depreciation of sterling in the ensuing years.
V
The late 1960s and early 1970s, like today, were a multipolar era for reserve
currencies especially within the sterling area. This point has not been adequately
recognized in the literature where the assumption is that the US dollar was
all-conquering by the mid-1960s. In fact the US dollar was weakening during the
Vietnam era, and its growing dominance as a reserve currency in the 1970s mainly
reflected the absence of a strong alternative. The Deutsche Mark and yen could
have become alternatives but their respective monetary authorities, perhaps sen-
sibly, did not want to get into the troublesome business of supplying a reserve
currency. Given the pattern of debt service and trade in sterling, even the RBA did
not advocate reducing sterling below one-third of reserves, while New Zealand
continued to aim for at least half of its reserves in sterling. Between 1968 and 1974
the Sterling Agreements facilitated the managed and orderly diversification of
76 RBAA, BM-75-234, RBA board memorandum by International Department, 29 Aug. 1972; IT-h-309, telex
to Hinde in London from Johnston in Sydney, 11 May 1973.
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reserves to these levels. Sterling area members were offered protection against
capital losses, enabling them to take advantage of the high nominal returns on
sterling assets.
Through examining the historical record in the Australian and New Zealand
Treasury and central bank archives we have been able to reconstruct the evolution
of reserves policy in the 1960s and early 1970s. Our reasons for paying so much
attention to two relatively small economies are as follows. First, very few investi-
gations of the reserve currency choice have been conducted from the perspective
of holder countries using official archives from within those countries as opposed
to the issuer nations. Second, we found that although the techniques of foreign
reserves management in the 1960s and 1970s were crude by today’s standards, the
strategy was carefully considered. Australia and New Zealand realized that eco-
nomic fundamentals were driving them away from sterling, admittedly at different
speeds, but they also understood that initiating a run on the central reserves of the
sterling area would be disastrous, hence their willingness to cooperate with Britain
in the Sterling Agreements of 1968. The exchange guarantee enhanced the real
return on sterling assets, the limits were rarely binding, and sterling reserves were
managed down to the ex ante target levels. Moreover, the agreements allowed
Australia to exert pressure to keep open the still important London capital market.
Equally importantly, they lacked confidence in the stability of the US dollar, which
was the only possible alternative. They were eager to hold more third currencies,
especially the Deutsche Mark and yen, but were constrained by the reluctance of
West Germany and Japan to make large sums available. In a period of uncertainty,
they sought a portfolio of currencies rather than relying either on sterling or the US
dollar, partly on grounds of stability and the preservation of value, but also because
their economic interests were becoming global and not overwhelmingly dependent
on either the UK or the US.This final (and permanent) transition from sterling to
the dollar was carefully managed not only by the UK and G10 central banks but
also through the negotiating strategies of small countries such as Australia and
New Zealand, which sought to achieve diversification and continued access to the
London capital market without prompting a damaging run on the pound.
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